MODELO ONU ASOBILCA XXXII

COMMISSION GUIDE

INTERPOL

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ASOBILCA
ASOCIACIÓN DE COLEGIOS BILINGÜES DE CALI

Index

¡WELCOME TO ASOBILCA XXXII!

Dear Participants,

With great pride and enthusiasm, I welcome you to the thirty-second edition of the ASOBILCA Model United Nations. Today we begin a new edition of a project that, over the years, has established itself as a space for learning, dialogue, and leadership for young people committed to building a more just world and being conscious of its realities.

This edition represents much more than a new version of a Model United Nations; it represents a space where ideas find meaning, where dialogue becomes learning, and where committed young people choose to take on, with responsibility and sound judgment, the challenge of understanding and transforming the world around them. The ASOBILCA Model UN is the result of the conviction that education goes beyond the classroom, and that informed debate, active listening, and respect for differences are fundamental tools for building society. Each committee has been designed with the purpose of intellectually challenging you, inviting you to question the established order, and allowing you to explore the complexity of international affairs from a critical, empathetic, and solution-oriented perspective.

For me, as Secretary General, ASOBILCA Model UN XXXII is the materialization of a collective project built with effort, commitment, and vocation. Behind every guide, every topic, and every organizational detail are people who deeply believe in this model and in the impact it can have on the education of those who take part in it. None of this would be possible without the work of the Secretariat, the chairs, the staff, and the sponsors, whose efforts sustain the essence of this project.

But the truth is that this model belongs, above all, to you—to those who choose to prepare, research, debate, and represent with seriousness and respect. This model does not seek perfect speeches or simple answers, but rather honest reflections, well-founded positions, and a constant willingness to learn from others. Here, the true value lies in the process: in every argument constructed, in every negotiation attempted, and in every perspective understood. I hope this experience goes beyond the academic and becomes a space for personal growth. May ASOBILCA Model UN XXXII leave you with questions, learning, and connections that endure beyond the model, and above all, unforgettable memories. May you, at the close of this edition, recognize within yourselves a voice that is more aware, more critical, and more committed to the reality that surrounds you.

Thank you for being part of this dream called ASOBILCA XXXII and for trusting in this project. May these pages mark the beginning of a meaningful, formative, and memorable experience.

Sincerely,



Sebastián Ávila Cabal
Secretary General

WELCOME LETTER

Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to be presiding over this year's INTERPOL committee for ASOBILCA's XXXII version, and we cannot wait to see what lies ahead for this committee during the conference. A brief introduction of ourselves: We are Catalina Cadavid and Matthew Hart, representing Gimnasio la Colina, and Colegio Jefferson, respectively. Our background in prior MUN conferences, assuming roles such as presidents and delegates, has provided us with enough experience to be certain that, with our guidance and your disposition, we will make this model a transformative journey! In this MUN, we want you to exploit capacities such as diplomacy, debate, and public speaking, among other skills. Skills that will not only prove valuable during the model, but that will serve as lifelong tools to develop international perspectives and a strong leadership spirit.

As delegates you will be in charge of representing a position that may challenge your personal beliefs, but remember, proper preparation and strong knowledge of the topic are the keys for excellence. Thus, we highly advise you to read the guide thoroughly, since it is a significant tool for a broader understanding of the topic. Furthermore, your active participation during the session is fundamental for the development of the committee, so we highly request you not hesitate to speak; your contribution may be a catalyst for the course of the debate. Lastly, we want to emphasize that you can count on us to resolve any doubts that may arise during this process, and assure you that we will be there to answer them as soon as we can.

Sincerely,

Catalina Cadavid
President

Matthew Hart
President

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is an intergovernmental body whose importance is on strengthening international security by combating transnational crime. To do this, the organization assists in locating fugitives around the world, investigative support like forensics and analysis, and training national policing forces. (INTERPOL, n.d.). The organization is independent from the United Nations. However, in 1997, it signed a formal cooperation agreement with the UN, allowing it to provide criminal data and identify suspects or missing persons on a larger scale.

INTERPOL's relevance lies in the fact that many modern security threats extend across borders and cannot be addressed by a single country. INTERPOL focuses on some of the most pressing matters in our modern day. Transnational crimes such as terrorism, human trafficking, cybercrime, and organized crime networks are often difficult to track because of a lack of international cooperation. This is where the organization shows its cruciality; it strengthens international databases to ultimately resolve these complex international security threats. Given its nature as an international policing body, the institution works on a wide range of crime areas: "This expertise supports national efforts in combating crimes across four global areas we consider the most pressing today: terrorism; cybercrime; organized crime; and financial crime and anti-corruption." (INTERPOL., n.d.). It manages international criminal databases that store information on fingerprints, DNA profiles, stolen vehicles, and wanted persons. Through its communication system called I-24-7, police forces in all member states can exchange notices and alerts, such as Red Notices, which request the location and arrest of fugitives.

Given the new technological landscape, the debates in this committee play an imperative role, as they will allow delegates to examine how international cooperation can adapt to new forms of crime and evolving technological threats. Delegates will consider questions related to the balance between security and innovation and the need to strengthen protection for vulnerable populations in this new digital age. Delegates will ultimately have the opportunity to see how these international security challenges interact with broader global development objectives. As digital technologies reshape social, economic, and institutional landscapes, discussions will highlight how effective policing and responsible technological governance can influence the ability of states to make progress in key areas of global well-being. Ultimately, it will derive a cohesive conclusion of today's modern issue: Which long term development goals can be pursued?

TOPIC 1:

POLICING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: SHOULD ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BE MADE WIDELY ACCESSIBLE TO ADVANCE THE SDGS, OR RESTRICTED TO GOVERNMENTAL PREROGATIVE TO ENSURE SECURITY AND PREVENT CYBERCRIME?

Historical Context

The early development of the internet began with a U.S. Department of Defense research project aimed at creating decentralized digital communication networks. The project's name was The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). Later, throughout the following years, this network expanded to include universities, research institutions, and later commercial actors, mainly located in technologically advanced nations such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea (Roser, M., 2018). Though some may argue that the launch of the World Wide Web (WWW) in 1991 helped provide equitable access to digital information, others may argue that, sure, it made the internet easier to navigate, which opened the door to public use, but it still remained highly uneven. Countries with stronger telecommunications networks (Global North) integrated the Web rapidly, while many regions which struggled with structural barriers (Global South) limited adoption. (OECD, 2001). This shows that from the very beginning, transnational internet operations have been

overwhelmingly concentrated within the Global North, creating a digital divide between the Global North and Global South.

Since the early development of the internet, there has always been an unequal access which emerged between what is known as the Global North and Global South. As defined by the Center for International Relations and International Security "The Global South/North divide is a conceptual framework that highlights socioeconomic and political inequalities between wealthier, industrialized nations (the Global North) and less developed, often economically disadvantaged nations (the Global South)." (CIRIS, 2024). Given this definition, the distinction is not only seen from a geographical point of view –between the North and Southern

Fig 2: "Visual representation of the spread of ARPANET as of September

hemispheres– yet encompasses a broader socioeconomic and political lens, often rooted in colonialism and global economic structures.



Fig 3: "A map showing a common depiction of the Global North and the Global South, as divided by the Brandt Line. However, it is important to note that there is not universal agreement regarding where some countries belong within this framework." (Kenny & Miles, 2024). Retrieved from: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-North-and-Global-South

Global North and Global South A map showing a common depiction of the Global North and the Global South, as divided by the Brandt Line. However, it is important to note that there is

no universal agreement regarding where some countries belong within this framework. (Britannica)

By the early 2000s, there was already a digital divide between nations before the development of Artificial Intelligence. While Northern countries had widespread broadband access, expanding mobile internet access and growing domestic tech industries (i.e. Apple, Intel, Microsoft, Juniper Networks), many Southern nations still relied on slow, expensive connectivity. Some of which had entire rural regions offline. Examples include Brazil, Colombia, and other South American nations. (Cedal.) Looking at the disparities in the Middle East, according to the data collated by the International Telecommunication Union (as shown in public UN-data tables), Egypt's internet penetration was less than 1% around 2000, and remained very low in the early 2000s. (UNdata, 2000). As we will come to see, these historical disadvantages continue to affect the development of AI in several nations.

Thus, moving from general digital access to artificial intelligence specifically, it is important to examine the historical origins of AI itself. Artificial intelligence originated in the 1950s, beginning with Alan Turing's theory called the Turing Test. It introduced the idea of evaluating machine intelligence (Turing, 1950). AI became a formal discipline at the 1956 Dartmouth Conference, marking the birth of organized research into symbolic reasoning and problem-solving systems (Dartmouth College). Early AI relied on human-written rules and logic programs, such as the Logic Theorist, that attempted to replicate human reasoning through symbolic methods. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

The modern debate on AI accessibility versus state control began in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The rise of statistical learning models in the 1990s and breakthroughs such as IBM's Deep Blue demonstrated how AI could outperform humans in complex tasks. This prompted governments and industries to invest heavily in AI, although back then the coined term was "*automated decision systems*" (IBM Archives). In the 2010s, the emergence of deep learning (AlexNet neural network, 2012), accelerated AI adoption across healthcare, finance, policing, and communication (University of Toronto). These technologies required large datasets and significant computational power, which, as discussed previously, created early disparities between technologically advanced nations (Global North) and those with limited

infrastructure (Global South). By the early 2020s, AI reached a new stage with generative models, which made the technology much more accessible, but with increased risk. Public tools like GPT-3 and image generators like Stable Diffusion allowed the civilian population, companies, and even low-resource countries alike to use advanced AI that was once available to only big research labs (HugginFace). At the same time, governments grew worried due to cybersecurity threats, misinformation, and the misuse of AI by criminal or extremist groups. The creation of more powerful multimodal systems like GPT-4 expanded AI's influence even further. Reaching areas of education and public services, but also made it harder for states to regulate a technology that crosses borders (OpenAI). These changes directly shape today's debate on whether AI should be widely available or restricted to protect national and international security.

Building on this evolution of AI accessibility and risk, the global debate now manifests most clearly in the divide between technologically dominant states. The Global North, mainly being the United States, where private AI investment in 2024 reached US$ 109.1 billion, more than 12x China's US$ 9.3 billion, highlighting the U.S. dominance in funding and model-production capacity (Stanford HAI, 2025). Meanwhile, countries with strong governance and digital infrastructure (like Singapore, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, South Korea) push for regulation, safety, and standards. In the most recent "AI Readiness" rankings, the U.S. scored top overall, with Singapore second and the UK third. This demonstrates that both investment capacity and regulatory readiness shape countries' roles in AI deployment (Gupta, S., 2025). Finally, emerging middle-income nations and regional powers (e.g. India, Brazil, Middle-East and Latin American states) push demands for broader access, equity, and capacity building. They view generative and ML AI as tools for development, education, and social progress. The resulting tension between supply, safety and governance, and equity and development is what defines and drives today's global debate on AI. Ultimately, it is these diverse groups that represent the inequity of today's digital divide.

Current Situation

To understand the broader accessibility issues that affect the Global South in modern day, it is important to look at the issue not only from a socioeconomic perspective, but from the interest of the Global North's transnational security considerations. Export controls are used to restrict advanced hardware, software, and services from getting into the hands of non-state violent actors. Wealthier states (i.e. United States, United Kingdom, EU) have performed restrictions on high-performance semi-conductors, cloud services, and dual-income technologies, citing risks of misuse, proliferation, and cybercrime; these policies functionally limit the capacity of lower-resource states (i.e. Iran, Egypt, Palestine) to develop or deploy advanced AI systems. "Meanwhile, BIS issued an Interim Final Rule introducing new Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules, including Footnote 5 designations and adding controls on high-bandwidth memory, semiconductor manufacturing equipment and software keys to limit the export of U.S.-origin technologies used in military or strategic applications." (HKT Law analysis, 2024). Furthermore, conflict zones and territories where non-state violent actors operate are frequently securitized in global policy discourse, which raises political and legal barriers to commercial and institutional technology transfer. This proves that among an infrastructure divide, there also lies an "intelligence divide," where Global North states preserve privileged access to AI capabilities under the rationale of security, while many Global South states face constrained access even when the development and public-service uses are intended. The following states the definition of the Interim Final Rule (IFR) implemented by the U.S. and states its influence over countries through its implementation: ""Export Control



Fig 4: *Estimated annual cost of cybercrime worldwide from 2018 to 2028 (Fleck, 2024). Retrieved from: https://www.statista.com/chart/28878/expected-cost-of-cybercrime-until-2027/?srsltid=AfmBOoonb86S-*

Framework for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Diffusion." This rule would impose country-specific caps, along with a license regime on U.S. exports of semiconductors that would most notably impact GPU chips that underpin key AI applications such as the development of large language models (LLMs)." (ITIF, 2025). In an attempt to use export controls to limit the ability of geostrategic competitors such as China and Russia, the U.S. directly affects the technological infrastructure of other less developed nations, not allowing them to advance in crucial bandwidth infrastructure to utilize AI tools for a number of public-service uses.

Empirical measures of AI diffusion show rapid overall uptake, but it skewed in concentration. Microsoft's AI diffusion analysis reports over one billion users of AI tools shortly after their commercial scaling, yet adoption rates cluster in wealthy, well-connected countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and advanced economies in North America, East Asia and Western Europe (Microsoft, 2025). Concurrently, roughly 2.2 billion people remain offline and many more lack quality infrastructure needed for AI (ITU, 2025). At the policy level, as discussed previously, a series of strengthening export controls and entity lists have restricted shipments of advanced chips and server equipment to certain jurisdictions, and some states now require permits or pre-notification for transits of high-performance AI chips (e.g., recent U.S. and allied measures; Malaysia's 2025 permit rule for U.S.-origin AI chips) (Reuters, 2025). Law-enforcement and multilateral agencies have documented the rapid weaponization of AI for cybrercrime–deepfakes, automated intrusion, and fraud–thereby reinforcing the security justification used by some states to limit dissemination (UNODC, 2025). Together, these data and policies show that technical scarcity (chips, data centers), regulatory scarcity (export controls, entity lists), and security narratives (cybercrime risk) interact to produce a significant divide in who can access and benefit from AI.

Multilateral bodies and private actors have acknowledged both the need for governance and the risk of exclusion. Instruments such as the Wassenaar Arrangement inform export control norms for dual-use technologies, while international organizations (UN agencies, UNODC, ITU) call for capacity building and equitable access as part of development agendas (Wassenaar Arrangement). Nonetheless, policy action remains uneven. Export controls and strategic trade measures tend to be designed and implemented by Global North states or

alliances, and those tools are often justified with security language that can functionally reproduce patterns of technological dependency and control, akin to what scholars describe as digital colonialism or data colonialism (Royalsociety/Decolonizing AI literature; policy analyses). This dynamic creates political discourse among delegations: States with advanced industrial bases (e.g., United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, South Korea, Singapore, United Arab Emirates) are likely to prioritize controls and "trusted partner" access, while delegations from many countries that experienced colonial subjugation or continue to face structural dependence (e.g., Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, India, Mexico) will emphasize capacity building transfer, and non-discriminatory access. Middle Eastern delegations (e.g., Israel, Palestine, Iran, Saudi Arabia) will produce complex positions shaped by national security concerns within their regional conflicts, and differing international designations. Policy debates about "who is trusted" thus become entangled with historical grievances, sovereignty claims, and geopolitical alignments rather than being purely technical disputes.

In short, the evidence shows that an intelligence divide is consolidated across several nations due to the infrastructure inequality, export controls, and security narratives about AI misuse. The security rationale, grounded in real and emerging cybercrime threats, has been mobilized by several advanced states to justify restrictions that, intentionally or not, limit access to lower-capacity states. This creates what could be called a "policy paradox": restricting access is argued to prevent harm, yet such restrictions may also reproduce dependency and deepen historical inequities associated with colonial and neo-colonial power.

Case Study

The U.S. AI Export Controls on China (2022–present)

Competition over Semiconductor Exports and AI Power

Semiconductors are the fundamental electronic devices used as the building blocks of advanced technology; more importantly, Artificial Intelligence (AI). They are crucial for the development of national security and industrial objectives. Semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are seen by policymakers, including the United States, the People's Republic of China, and other countries, as essential to future economic competitiveness, national security, and global leadership. It has been of utmost priority to these nations to convert themselves as a world-leading semiconductor industry, where they can utilize their government financial resources and implement certain importing policies to develop foreign commercial ties. The earliest example of this global ambition on AI leadership is the ongoing policy-conflict of the U.S. and China. Dating back to 2014, China's government implemented an industrial policy to national semiconductor manufacturing with the stated goal of "*establishing a world-leading semiconductor industry in all areas of the integrated circuit supply chain by 2030.*" (Sutter, K. M., 2025). The U.S. government, being an adversary to China's strengthening semiconductor industry, pursued in implementing export regulations of advanced semiconductors, stating that these policies were being carried out with the intent *"of both restricting* [People's Republic of China] *access to the technologies and ability to produce advanced chips, and curtailing* [People's Republic of China] *access to related computing and AI applications."* (Sutter, K. M., 2025). The U.S. aims to keep leadership in advanced chips, AI, and the semiconductor supply chain. The policies that the government implemented sought to slow China's development of competing technologies. Before 2018, U.S. licensing allowed some firms to aid China's semiconductor growth; however, newer controls restrict China's access to advanced technology.

United States

Fig 5: "Smartphone with a Huawei logo is seen in front of a U.S. flag in this illustration taken September 28, 2021." (Shepardson, 2021). Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/technology/biden-signs-legislation-tighten-us-restrictions-huawei-zte-2021-11-11/

Focusing on the United States government, the first Trump Administration expanded export controls on semiconductor technologies to China. The reason for this being national-security concerns. The expansion relied on an actor-based approach, adding PRC firms to the Entity List (EL) of the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The EL includes foreign persons/entities involved in activities related to U.S. national security of foreign policy interests. An example of which is Huawei. It meant U.S. and non-U.S. companies need special government permission (export licenses) to sell certain technologies to Huawei–A Chinese company. In 2020, BIS expanded the Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule (FDPR) to apply U.S. export restrictions to any firm producing chips for Huawei using U.S. technology, software, or equipment. Furthermore, in the same year, BIS reconstituted the Military End User (MEU) List, covering entities in China and Russia, requiring licenses for specific dual-use exports due to military-transfer risks. The MEU is a list of companies or organizations in certain countries that the U.S. government believes are connected to the military or could use U.S. technology for military purposes. The ultimate goal of this reconstituted label was to prevent China and Russia from strengthening their military capabilities. (Sutter, K. M., 2025).

While the U.S. semiconductor export regulations were initially designed to limit China's access to advanced AI capabilities, their effects extend far beyond this bilateral rivalry. Because nearly every country relies on U.S.-origin semiconductor tools, chip-design software, and cloud-based AI compute, these controls reshape access to AI technologies for the entire Global South. The controls create a "risk-based" hierarchy of nations. Those of "High trust" (U.S., EU, Japan, South

Korea) end up with less export control policies in comparison to those of "Low trust" (Middle East, Africa, parts of Latin America). Nations that are not part of the U.S. "trusted partners" network face indirect barriers, delayed access, and dependency on older-generation chips—widening the AI gap between advanced economies and developing regions. (Gupta, K., Borges, C., & Palazzi, A. L., 2024).

How Export Controls Exacerbate the Digital Divide

In summary, these governmental policies implemented by the Global North that restrict important technological resources from indirectly arriving to the less developed Global South, create profound implications for equitable accessibility to AI. U.S. export controls are justified on grounds of preventing military misuse, cyberwarfare, and malicious AI deployment. This subjective risk assessment done by the nations of superior technological infrastructure, end up classifying Global South countries as higher-risk environments, meaning licensing delays, denied permits, restricted access to high-end compute models, such as semiconductors, and an inability to purchase GPUs for research or industry purposes. The result is a security-induced digital divide, where global AI access is determined by geopolitics, not developmental needs.

In conclusion, because global semiconductor manufacturing is highly interconnected, U.S. controls on China create worldwide ripple effects. Suppliers in Taiwan, South Korea, and the Netherlands must comply with U.S. export restrictions, and as high-end chips become limited, middle-income and low-income countries are pushed further back in the supply chain. The result is that the Global South faces higher costs and slower access to the computing infrastructure required for AI development. "*Hayakawa (2024) found a decline in exports of US ICs and equipment to China after the October 2022 controls were instituted and a decline in exports of IC products from South Korea and Taiwan to China after the August 2020 tightening of the FDPR. Hayakawa et al. (2023) also found that the August 2020 enhancement of the FDPR hurt Japanese exports of mobile phones and other wireless network devices to China.*" (Allen, G. C., n.d.).

Key Points

- National Security Priorities... Delegates must weigh how advanced AI models and chips enable military, cyber, and intelligence capabilities. Why states fear that unfriendly actors might misuse open access.
- Export Controls as a Tool of Power... The U.S. controls on AI-enabling chips (A100, H100, etc.) demonstrate how technologically advanced nations can unilaterally regulate global access to frontier AI systems.
- Collateral Effects on Developing Nations... Restrictions aimed at China also unintentionally (or not) limit AI development capacity in low and middle-income countries. This widens the digital divide.
- Cybercrimes and non-state violent actors' utilization and its risks... High-risk nations (those with active extremist groups or unstable cyber environments) raise legitimate fears about AI misuse (deepfakes, autonomous malware, encryption breaking).
- Artificial Intelligence's role in the advancement of the SDGs... The debate regarding what AI accessibility could accelerate regarding the current sustainable development goals. Debates on whether it's worth the risk of added cybercrime.

Guiding Questions

- Questions to guide delegates in preparing their position papers and building their arguments.
- How does your country's position within the Global North-South divide shape its access to advanced semiconductors and AI technologies?
- How much does your delegation rely on foreign exports? What reliance does the delegation have to the Global North corporations for AI infrastructure?
- Does your delegation benefit from existing export-control frameworks, or is it disadvantaged by "trusted partner" vs. "high-risk" classifications?
- What are your delegation's political alignments? To what major power or regional bloc do they take part of? How does it affect the delegation's ability to develop AI infrastructure?

- What historical factors (colonialism, conflict, sanctions, technological dependency) influence your delegation's current stance on AI accessibility?
- In your delegation's opinion, should technologically advanced states have to ensure equitable AI access for developing nations? If not, what and/or which nations are the exception?

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TOPIC 2:

CROSS-BORDER JURISDICTIONAL GAPS'S ROLE IN THE AGGRAVATION OF ONLINE MINOR SEXTORTION

Historical Context

Sextortion is defined by Cambridge University as "the practice of forcing someone to do something, particularly to perform sexual acts, by threatening to publish naked pictures of them or sexual information about them" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023). Although recently it has become more common to see evidence of these cases, sextortion has always been present within our digital society. The first known use of the word *sextortion* was in 1949, but it was not until 2008 that this term was officially recognized by the International Association of Women Judges. According to UNICEF (2025), three decades ago, global connectivity was limited to only a few million individuals; however, now that international interconnection has taken over the world, the number of people who have access to technology every single day has rapidly escalated to over 5 billion people, including 1.3 billion children from ages 3 to 17. The fast shift from in-person communication to online communication worldwide has also had an impact on crime, especially in cases of online minor abuse.

As a result of the previously mentioned transformation in global communication and the shift from in-person crime to digital crime, states were compelled to implement jurisdictions addressing cybercrime and safeguarding children's rights. One of the first major legal measures was made by the United Nations in May 2000: the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (to the Convention on the Rights of the Child), an international treaty made to counter child prostitution and pornography. The treaty contains a wide range of articles defending children's rights and demanding that states implement these articles within their criminal and penal codes, recognizing the offenses mentioned in each article as punishable and legally binding. This treaty was set as a pillar for the early protections

implemented by international organizations and states, criminalizing sexual materials involving minors before the internet, which means that states had a legal basis to prosecute exploitation. Furthermore, other nations had prior internal policies and laws that addressed the need for guaranteeing the protection of youth. The United Kingdom implemented the "Protection of Children Act" which prohibited the distribution of inappropriate photographs of minors in 1978, stating: "It is an offence for a person -to take, or permit to be taken, any indecent photograph of a child" (*Protection of Children Act 1978, 1978, c.37*). It also articulates that no individual shall be in possession of said inappropriate content nor distribute or publish indecent content (GOV.UK, 2010).

Nations such as the United States updated prior policies such as the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. The first update was in 1988, a time in which online activity was in its earliest stages of development, with the new Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act, a legislation aimed at opposing the new widespread use of child pornography; followed by the 1990 act titled Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act, that also aimed to counter this same increase in child pornography on computers and restricted the possession of such content. Lastly, the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) passed in 1996, with almost the same aim as the above-mentioned laws, but now implemented stricter laws to ban "virtual" child pornography, yet, in 2002, congress argued that this said virtual pornography did not involve real minors, but rather computer-generated images or adults altered to look very young, thus The Supreme Court "struck down two of its provisions" (*Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (1977)*, 2024). However, these types of legislation became insufficient since the digital era started and the abuse became transnational. Laws were not designed for emerging technologies such as "encrypted communications, anonymous payment systems and cryptocurrencies" (*Organized Child Sexual Exploitation in South East Asia*, 2025).

In the early 2000s, child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA), evolved into online child sexual exploitation and abuse (OCSEA). According to Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, "Livestreaming of child sexual abuse, sextortion, and the sale of CSAM now operate through cross-border chains that link facilitators, recruiters, and payment handlers." (*Organized Child Sexual Exploitation in South East Asia*, 2025), indicating that the global spread

of the internet facilitated the organization and sophistication of organized criminal groups regarding the production and distribution of child sexual abuse material involving underage individuals (CSAM) (*Organized Child Sexual Exploitation in South East Asia*, 2025). There was also seen a lack of coordination in between states when it came to develop cross-boarder child-abuse prevention laws, online child-abuse is now transnational by default, which suggests that, because of customary international law and state sovereignty, states found themselves in a position in which they could not investigate an offense that was committed in a foreign territory impeding proper prosecution of cybercrime and major psychological and physical implications for the victim (Witting, 2021).

Current Situation

Exposure to Social Media within minors:

Nowadays, minors of all ages are exposed to unsupervised internet access, situations which can make them more vulnerable to coercion. The rise of technology has played a crucial role in the aggravation of online minor sextortion cases. It has been recorded that up to 95% of teenagers between the ages of 13 and 17 use social media platforms, and although the minimum age for access to social media is 13 years old, more than 40% of children between the ages of 8 to 12 are exposed to these platforms (National Library of Medicine, 2023). In Mexico alone, there is a concerning rise in the exposure of minors to social media; in 2017, the percentage of minors who made use of these platforms was 39%, while in 2022 it increased to 69% (Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones, 2017). Additionally, according to the *World Health Organization* (2024), in Europe there was an increase in problematic social media use in teenagers from 2018 to 2022, with rates rising from 8% to 11%, and over a third of these adolescents being in regular contact with "online friends".



Fig 6: Visual representation of online child sextortion (Davis, 2022) Retrieved from: https://www.missingkids.org/blog/2022/sextortion-the-hidden-pandemic

Moreover, in relation to cases of online minor sextortion, the first connection with the perpetrator can start with a threat. The perpetrator may claim they already possess intimate content of the victim and disclose that this content will be shared if the minor does not send more explicit pictures. However, the first contact may also happen through the aforementioned unsupervised connection with "online friends". This connection can lead the child to believe they are communicating with a real person; once the aggressor gains the child's trust they may lead the victim to believe they want a relationship or, in some cases, offer the victim something of value in exchange for intimate photos. Thereafter, the violator may ask for monetary compensation in exchange for not sharing the photos, leaving the child in a completely vulnerable position (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2025).

Organized Criminal Groups (OCGs), Main Actors and Strategies:

Sextortion is mostly, as priorly stated, driven by organized crime groups that operate in different nations. The bases of these groups are mainly located in West African countries and Southeast Asia. The prime goal of these groups is not to obtain any sexual gratification out of the images, but rather to make a profit from them in a short amount of time. Research even stresses that extortion may occur an hour after the first contact with the victim (National Crime Agency, 2025). Despite what may be assumed, organized criminal groups are more likely to target teenage boys between the ages of 13 and 17, rather than girls, because they are more willing to communicate with strangers online. Their main strategy is to pose as young girls, often using fake accounts and AI generated images, in order to convince young boys to send them sexually explicit content. Moreover, Artificial Intelligence's systems such as Gen AI are often used to

Fig 7: Nigerian cybercriminals "Yahoo Plus Plus" (ENACT Africa, 2024) Retrieved from: https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/escrocs-yahoo-boys-entre-crimes-rituels-et-magie-noire

create sexually explicit content without it being provided by the victims With the help of such technologies hackers can simply take a photo of the target's face and make it seem as if they were committing a compromising act (R.Aronashvili, 2024). Considering the victim is a minor, in almost all cases they do not have the financial resources to pay off the amount that is being demanded; therefore, as another way of payment, the offender may ask for access to the child's home network, parent's email or bank account information, access to private information of the relative's companies, among other data that compromises the safety of the family unit (R.Aronashvili, 2024).

One of the main Organized Criminal Groups (OCGs) is the Yahoo Boys, a West African OCG that operates mainly in Nigeria. This group targets boys in nations such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and several European countries, among other developed nations. However, Nigeria is not the only important nation when it comes to OCGs; there is reportedly a significant number of identified gangs in countries such as the Philippines, Côte d'Ivoire, and India, where approximately 500 cases of financial sexual extortion occur daily. Sextortion is a worldwide threat, and it must be addressed. In the United Kingdom there was a clear increase in cases of OCSEA (Online Minor Exploitation and Abuse) from 2022 to 2023. In 2022 there were 10,731 reports of OCSEA, while in 2023 this number escalated to 26,718 reports. A similar case occurred in the United States, where the FBI reported more than 7,000 reports of financial sex extortion against minors (WeProtect Global Alliance, 2024). Perpetrators tend to operate from developing countries or countries that do not have enough child protection jurisdictions, and this is because, according to *WeProtect Global Alliance:* "The transnational nature of financial sexual extortion means that perpetrators and victims often reside in different countries, allowing criminals to use jurisdictional boundaries to their advantage and evade detection and prosecution." (WeProtect Global Alliance, 2024, p.8). Demonstrates the need for harmonization between national and international policies against child exploitation.

Jurisdictional Gaps and Lack of International Compliance:

Territorial jurisdiction is defined as "the authority of a state or legal body to exercise power and enforce laws within a specific geographic area" (*Fiveable*, 2025). It implies that territorial jurisdiction is the power given to a state to exercise authority and enforce laws within its own territory. In contrast to territorial jurisdiction, there is also extraterritorial jurisdiction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the legal ability of a state to enforce laws or exercise authority beyond its own borders. This concept goes against the principle of non-intervention in customary international law and the principle of sovereignty. Nonetheless, according to the Budapest Convention and Lanzarote Convention, extraterritorial jurisdictions can be enforced in the cases of child prostitution and pornography. Still, the two conventions previously mentioned, contained very generic clauses that do not provide guidance on how to address jurisdictional conflicts regarding cybercrime.

As outlined by the NGO *End Child Prostitution and Trafficking (ECPAT)* (2022), extraterritorial jurisdiction could serve as a tool to reduce impunity in cases such as sexual exploitation of children, allowing punishment for offenders, who, due to weakened legal systems or loopholes, have not been held accountable for their actions. Also, according to the same article, in the case of not prosecuting these offenders, "individuals could choose to travel to countries with tolerant laws to commit crimes against children, knowing that they will not be prosecuted after returning home" (*ECPAT*, 2022). Leaving cases unresolved with no reparation for the victims. The above-mentioned loopholes, more evident in developing countries' legal systems

, can be caused due to these not legally recognising "*sextortion*" as a violation. Countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Kenya, and Taiwan, major targets of online minor sextortion, have not adopted laws that directly address this term, making cases difficult to prosecute properly.

Financial, Mental and Physical Implications for Children:

For many minors, sextortion is more than just a crime. They suffer firsthand the severe financial, mental and physical Implications of these atrocities. According to the USA's Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) "Victims report feeling scared, alone, embarrassed, anxious, and desperate. Many feel like there's no way out of the situation." Other sources also stress that child survivors are 2 to 4 times more likely to self-harm and to experience suicidal thoughts. Some children are left with serious mental health issues such as: depression, anxiety and, in the worst cases, these traumatic experiences lead them to take their own lives. Amanda Todd, a survivor of this pandemic, told her story and expressed that she had been dealing with depression since her "online friend", who she had sent a picture of her breasts to, told her "put on a show for me" and threatened to publish the pictures if she didn't. The trauma after this incident left her with an unbearable pain that concluded in her suicide (Davis, 2022).

Another severe case of sextortion occurred in California, where a 17 year-old boy, Ryan Last, took his life at 2 in the morning, because he had been scammed. Moreover, it is reported that more than 40% of the victims had to pay around 100 to 500 dollars. Nevertheless, criminals are now raising the sums of payment because of the scale of activity. Finally, there is no guarantee that the photos are going to be deleted thus, the aggressors may demand multiple payments or schedule payment plans, which are unsustainable for a person without income such as a child or adolescent (We Protect Global Alliance, 2024, p.4).

Fig 8: Brandon Guffey, a South Carolina state representative, holds a picture of his son Gavin Guffey, 17, who died by suicide in 2022, during a U.S. Senate hearing on Capitol Hill in January 2024 (Balk, 2025) Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/27/us/nigerian-extradited-sextortion-teen-

3. Case Study: Nigeria's Involvement in the aggravation of online minor sextortion.

A twenty-four year-old Nigerian man called Hassanbunhussein Abolore Lawal was extradited from Nigeria to the United States on the counts of "child exploitation resulting in death; distribution of child pornography; coercion and enticement of a minor; cyberstalking resulting in death; and interstate threats with intent to extort" (Balk, 2025). The victim, Gavin Gunffey, was a 17 year-old boy from South Carolina, who 2 hours after the scheme took his life with a firearm in his

own home. The alleged offender pleaded innocence, however, he could be facing from 30-years to life in prison if found guilty. The sextortion scheme Lawal is being prosecuted for discloses that Lawal convinced Gavin to send him sexually explicit photos, posing as a young girl, and then demanded monetary compensation in exchange for not releasing the damaging images. After the incident it was stated that Lawal also tried to scam other family members of the victim, but was unsuccessful (Balk, 2025; Abubakar, 2025). Unfortunately, this was not the first time a case of the sort presented itself in the United States, because according to FBI reports from July of 2021 and July of 2023, 20 teenagers committed suicide after being victimized and sextorted by other transnational Organized Criminal Groups (Balk, 2025).

Along the same lines, Organized Criminal Groups (OCGs) in Nigeria play a crucial role in the aggravation of this growing phenomenon, with Nigeria being the African country with the most documented cases of organized crime perpetrated by OCGs. These groups victimize all demographics, but they have lately been focused on targeting younger populations, specifically male athletes, who are seen as more vulnerable to sextortion because of their social status. The consequences that the schemes carried out by these groups may bring along for a child are devastating. Another case that brought up concerns about this rising problematic of online minor sextortion is the case of Jordan DeMay, a 17-year-old high school athlete who was contacted on March 24, 2022 at 10:19 p.m. by an account who posed as "Dani.Robertts"-an alleged 19-year-old college woman from Atlanta. They spoke for two hours before she suggested playing "sexy games" with Jordan. He at first refused the proposal, claiming she may not be a real person. However, the pressure escalated when she sent him an intimate photo of herself. Thereafter, Jordan went into his bathroom while his family was asleep, pulled down his pants, and took a picture in the mirror. As soon as Jordan submitted the photo, the scheme began. The two Nigerian perpetrators, brothers Samuel and Samson Ogoshi, asked for 1,000 dollars in exchange for not sharing the compromising content with Jordan's friends and family, especially his girlfriend Kayla who was key for their strategy. Jordan offered the 355 dollars he had at that moment, but this did not satisfy the offenders, and they demanded an extra 800 dollars. Then, the account started sending more messages claiming his girlfriend would leave him for someone else and threatening to make his life miserable. With one final apology to his girlfriend and one "I love you" to his mother, Jordan took his life with a

40-caliber handgun (Wetzel, 2025). Although the two brothers were sentenced to 210 months in prison and five years of supervised release on the counts of conspiracy against minors (*U.S Department for Justice*, 2025), the devastating stories of Gavin Gunffey and Jordan DeMay disclose the need for immediate action against international sextortion, particularly in the light of internal instability in countries such as Nigeria, in which because of the lack of comprehensive policies fail to address the phenomenon of online minor sextortion.

Key Points

- The role of social media platforms and the unsupervised use of these platforms in the aggravation of online minor sextortion.
- The lack of updated policies against cybercrime in developing nations, leading to impunity for Organized Criminal Groups (OCGs).
- The tension between maintaining sovereignty and the proper prosecution of transnational online child sexual exploitation and abuse (OCSEA).
- The severe financial, psychological and physical implications of online minor sextortion.
- The role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its free accessibility in enabling more sophisticated mechanisms of sextortion.
- The urge for states to legally recognise sextortion as a specific crime to guarantee proper prosecution of criminals.

Guiding Questions

1. Does your country have existing legislation addressing child prostitution and child pornography? If so, how have they been adapted to the rise of the new digital era?
2. What regulations or restrictions does your country implement regarding social media use or digital services among underage users?
3. Has your country successfully prosecuted or taken into custody any offenders that committed a crime involving sextortion?

4. How does your country address the jurisdictional gaps involving transnational online child sexual exploitation and abuse (OCSEA)?
5. Is your country a signing member of any international treaties addressing online child sexual exploitation and abuse (OCSEA)?
6. Has your country identified any internal or foreign Organized Criminal Groups involved in online minor sextortion? If so, what are the efforts it is currently making to counter their activity?
7. What efforts has your country made to fund NGOs or programs to counter online minor sextortion nationally and/or internationally?
8. Which solutions does your delegation propose to strengthen global protection against transnational online child exploitation and abuse?

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FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We highly advise you to read the complete guide, since it is your main resource for finding out where the debate is moving towards. We also advise you to reference both the key points of the debate and the guiding questions in your research documents; these are there to lead you to the best and most appropriate solutions for the presented issues.
2. A great tip to structure your arguments is writing down the key points you want to reference in your interventions, in that way you don't read as much and you don't lose your focal point. Remember to quote from reliable sources, use the board, the projector, among other resources; these are not only going to help you out when making stronger arguments, but will also make yourself seen and heard by other delegates, which will be crucial for the flow of the debate.
3. We also want to encourage you to speak, you as a delegate can change the course of the debate! So do not feel intimidated. Emphasize on showcasing your point of view and providing coherent solutions to the presented issues, rather than attacking other delegates. Use this recommendation as a bridge for negotiation throughout the debate. Remember to always form alliances with delegates whose ideas align with your position, so make sure your alliances are formed according to your country's international relationships.
4. Remember that AI is a tool, so use it wisely. The Incorrect use of AI is punishable, thus abstain from copy-pasting directly from AI sources.
5. We are certain that during this model you will strengthen abilities such as public speaking, leadership skills, diplomacy and teamwork, these abilities will serve as a lifelong tool for further models and diplomatic settings. Finally, we hope you enjoy this model as much as we enjoyed preparing everything for you!